INVESTIGATING THE RELATION BETWEEN COMMON CAUSE COUPLING FACTORS AND AGEING by NITOI Mirela et al.
JOURNAL OF NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2012 
46 
 
 
 
 
INVESTIGATING THE RELATION BETWEEN COMMON CAUSE  
COUPLING FACTORS AND AGEING 
 
1,2MIRELA NITOI, 3JAROSLAV HOLY and 4IRINA PAULA DINU 
 
1Institute for Nuclear Research Pitesti, Romania 
2EC JRC- Institute for Energy, Petten, The Netherlands 
3Nuclear Research Institute Rež, Husinec - Rež, Prague, Czech Republic 
4Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant, Cernavoda, Romania  
e-mail: mirela.nitoi@nuclear.ro 
 
 
Abstract 
Usually, probabilistic safety analyses are using the assumption of the constant component 
failure rate, and the assumption that the probability associated to common cause failure (CCF) 
will be constant in time. Still, as ageing phenomena could have some influence on components 
or systems performances, is probable that it could influence the probability of occurrence of 
CCFs also. This paper is devoted to investigation of the most important CCFs initiating factors 
from point of view of relation to ageing phenomena. The connections between CCF potential 
and ageing phenomena, as the influence of the individual prevention factors against CCF were 
evaluated. A questionnaire has been developed on this topic and all the inputs provided were 
summarized, compared and commented. The analysis has not been limited only to the list of 
negative factors that would increase the CCF potential, it has included also positive  factors 
representing the prevention and correction measures applied with the aim to avoid occurrence 
and recurrence of CCF events, whether related to ageing or not. Two main topics were 
discussed: a) the strength of relation between the individual CCF coupling factors (contributing 
to total CCF potential) and ageing phenomena; b) the effect of CCF prevention measures on 
the coupling factors versus ageing relation (estimated for those CCF coupling factors that were 
evaluated as coincident with ageing phenomena, with at least medium level of coincidence). 
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Introduction 
In the last years, it was acknowledged that the probabilistic 
safety analyses (PSA) tools have been reached a certain 
level of maturity, and PSA results can bring important 
issues to successfully complement deterministic analyses. 
Common cause failures (CCF) analysis has been an 
integral part of PSA scope for nuclear power plants for 
many years now [1], [2]. 
 
Since plant systems are normally equipped with several 
mutually redundant trains, the probability of multiple 
failures having the same cause of failure cannot be 
overlooked, and in some cases, these multiple failures 
occurring at the same time (or after some small time shift) 
are representing the systems susceptibility to potential loss 
of function. 
 
For the purpose of CCF analysis, the components cannot 
be judged alone, and they should be grouped. CCF groups 
include the components of the same type belonging to 
redundant trains of the same system (modelling of inter-
system residual dependencies is very rare in current PSA 
studies, although some plant specific experience may 
support this modelling).  
Common cause failure groups [3] can be established using 
the systematic searching for common points in design and 
operation, particularly related to the following items:  
service conditions; design or manufacturer attributes;  
environment characteristics; maintenance activities. The 
search for common points (as they represent aspects of 
possible CCF potential) is done systematically, in 
sufficient level of detail, using a checklist. The checklist 
for CCF identification is usually supplemented by plant 
walk-downs.  
 
The traditional probabilistic safety analyses are 
considering as true the assumption of the constant failure 
rate for components, as the assumption that the probability 
associated to common cause failure will be constant in 
time. Still, as ageing phenomena could have some 
influence on components or systems performances, it is 
probable that it could influence the probability of 
occurrence of common cause failures also.  
 
In case of ageing phenomenon, it is well known that some 
components are ageing much faster than the others and the 
failure potential spectrum is changed once more over 
components types, as soon as combined effect of 
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independent failure causes, CCF coupling factors and 
ageing is taken into consideration.  
 
The effects of ageing could be multiple and variable. On 
system availability level, ageing could induce the 
modification of system success criteria, could increase the 
CCF probability for highly redundant systems, and could 
change the list of contributors to overall system 
unavailability. On overall plant level, ageing could induce 
the modification of initiating event frequencies, the 
probability of mitigation of undesired events (probability 
of unavailability for safety systems), the occurrence of 
inter-systems CCF, the dominant sequences, and could 
change the list of major contributors to the accident 
sequences. 
 
In case of CCF, the individual independent failure 
potential is further combined with different strength of 
coupling factors effects, making the spectrum of failure 
potential to be distributed in different ways than the case 
when the ageing was not considered.  
 
The potential relation between common cause failures and 
ageing phenomena was studied [4] in the framework of EC 
JRC Ageing PSA (APSA) project, network dedicated to 
investigation of ageing effects using PSA studies. It is 
intended that the resulting knowledge from the project 
running will help PSA developers and users to efficiently 
incorporate the effects of equipment ageing into current 
PSA tools and models. 
 
Summarizing, APSA expected results are the following: 
- Contributions to a better understanding of important 
issues in modelling of ageing phenomena using PSA 
models; 
- Developed set of feasible approaches/models and 
methodological guidelines; 
- Proved feasibility of the proposed approaches/models by 
case studies results; 
- Provided support & training for correct application of the 
project methodological guidelines. 
 
 
Ageing phenomena connections with common cause 
failures coupling factors 
When CCF occurrence potential become effective (at 
some moment of time), it leads to multiple components 
failures (the initial failure is expanding to further 
components). In the reliability and risk analyses, common 
cause failures may be seen as a result of combination of 
two phenomena:  
- occurrence of the triggering event, which is leading to 
the unavailability of one component 
- existence of conditions for failure coupling (presence of 
common cause coupling factors), leading to loss of more 
redundant components of the same type and function. 
 
The symptoms of these two factors can be searched for in 
the operational records of NPP events. Both these issues, 
which form common cause failure together, may be related 
to ageing, having in coincidence or independent relations.  
The relation to ageing of the triggering event may be 
solved in detailed analyses of data records (records related 
to independent failures) and may be addressed in the basic 
component ageing models.  
 
The total level of CCF potential, particularly the first 
failure potential to expand to other components also, is not 
limited to the presence of common cause coupling factors, 
it depends also on the quality and strength of adopted 
strategy for CCF prevention. For most of the factors that 
initiate the occurrence of CCF events, elements of 
prevention and defence of common cause failures, having 
the defined role to limit the CCF potential, can be defined 
as well. Similar to the coupling factors, these anti-CCF 
factors can be investigated from point of view of 
connection with ageing also.  
 
As a consequence, analysis of link between CCF events 
and ageing should consist of two parts - analysis of CCF 
coupling factors over time and parallel analysis in time of 
prevention and defence factors. 
 
CCF coupling factors are divided into three basic 
categories, [5]: a) hardware based coupling factors; b) 
operational based coupling factors; c) environmental based 
coupling factors. 
 
The identical design and physical characteristics of the 
components may propagate failure mechanisms among 
several components, and they constitute the so-called 
hardware based coupling factors. They may be divided in 
two subcategories: hardware design category and hardware 
(manufacturing and installation) quality category. 
 
The design-related hardware couplings may be considered 
at system level and component level. System level 
coupling factors include features of the system (or groups 
of components), external to the components, that might 
cause the propagation of failures to more than one 
component. At component level, the coupling factors 
include features within the boundary of each component. 
 
The hardware design category includes the following 
coupling factors, [5]: 
▪ same physical appearance – describes the cases where 
several components have the same identifiers (colour, size, 
shape, code - letter or  number), which may lead to 
components misidentification by the operating or 
maintenance staff 
▪ system layout/ configuration – refers to the arrangement 
of components that form a system 
▪ same component internal parts – is referring to the case 
when several components may fail because of the failure 
of similar internal parts or subcomponents 
▪ same maintenance/ test/ calibration characteristics – are 
related to the similarity in maintenance/ test/ calibration 
requirements, including frequency, type, techniques, and 
required level of expertise for the personnel involved.  
 
The hardware quality coupling factors are referring to 
characteristics introduced as common elements for the 
quality of hardware, and include, [5]: 
▪ manufacturing attributes – is referring to the same 
manufacturer, same manufacturing method, same material 
and same quality control procedure 
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▪ construction/ installation attributes – refers to the same 
construction/ installation staff, construction/ installation 
procedure, same construction / installation / testing 
verification procedure. 
 
The coupling factors allowing the propagation of failure 
mechanisms due to the existence of identical operational 
characteristics among several components are called the 
operational-based coupling factors. These include [5]: 
▪ same operating team - refers to the events that may 
happen, if the same operator (team of operators) is 
assigned to operate all trains of a system. In this case, we 
have an increased probability that one operator error will 
affect multiple components simultaneously  
▪ same operating procedure - refers to the cases when 
operation of identical (functional or physical) components 
is governed by the same operating rules; as a direct 
consequence, any deficiency in the common procedure 
could induce failures of all these components.  
▪ same maintenance/ test/ calibration team - refers to the 
case when the same (maintenance/ test/ calibration) team 
is in charge of maintenance/ test/ calibration activities 
performed on multiple components 
▪ same maintenance/ test/ calibration procedures 
 
Since it is considered as impractical to develop and 
implement diverse procedures for non-diverse equipments, 
the common procedures could be responsible for multiple 
failures occurrences, due either to procedural errors, or to 
wrong interpretation of procedural steps.  
 
The coupling factors that propagate failure mechanisms on 
account of identical environmental characteristics are 
named environmental-based coupling factors and include:  
▪ same plant location - refers to exposure of all redundant 
components to the same environmental stresses, because 
of the same plant location (flood, fire, high humidity, 
earthquake)  
▪ same component location - refers to exposure of multiple 
components to similar environmental stresses, because of 
their concrete location (vibration, failure of ventilation 
systems, heat generated by other components). 
▪ internal environment/ working medium - is related to use 
of the same operating medium by multiple components. 
Operating with the same dirty water, for example, could 
cause multiple failures due to corrosion.  
 
Connections between components ageing and common 
cause failures should be seen as one specific topic of 
ageing treatment in the PSA study. 
 
The main goals of the analysis was to study the most 
important common cause failures initiating factors (CCF 
coupling factors) [6] from point of view of their relation to 
ageing phenomena. The study included two parts: one 
dedicated to analysis of plant operating experience and the 
other one to performing a qualitative analysis. The 
qualitative analysis part had as objective to investigate and 
to estimate the most important CCFs coupling factors from 
point of view of their relation to ageing phenomena. The 
efforts included the steps: 
• specification of spectrum of contributors representing 
CCF potential and CCF prevention factors 
• study and discussion of ageing impact on the CCF 
coupling factors 
• discussion on the impact of ageing phenomenon on 
prevention factors. 
 
Analysis of plant operational experience part had as 
objective to find evidence about relation between CCFs 
and ageing mechanisms, and it included as steps: 
• investigation of operational experience records, for any 
event which may be seen as CCF and, at the same time, as 
consequence of ageing mechanisms influence 
• analysis of examples of CCF events taken from real plant 
experience regarding any possible relation to ageing (to 
support or not the conclusions made during the first part of 
the analysis). 
 
A questionnaire has been developed on this topic and all 
the inputs provided (developed in completely independent 
way) were summarized, compared and commented. The 
structure of factors analysed corresponded to the typical 
schemes of CCF potential contributors, as identified and 
classified in the methodologies used in CCF analyses 
(qualitative and quantitative), [5, 6]. 
 
The analysis has not been limited only to the list of factors 
that would increase the CCF potential, it has investigated 
the influence of positive factors (representing prevention 
measures applied with the aim to avoid occurrence of CCF 
events, whether related to ageing or not) also. 
 
The following list of items, similar to checklist used in 
searching for CCF vulnerability [5], was used: component 
type (motor operated valve, pump, circuit breaker, etc.), 
including any special design / construction characteristics; 
component manufacturer, component function (system 
isolation, measurement, electric power supply); component 
boundaries and system interfaces; component visual 
similarity and corresponding supporting factors (location 
in the same room/ building, similar parts, identical control 
panels, similar tables with component identification data); 
internal conditions (pressure, temperature, flow, chemistry 
and radioactivity characteristics, voltage); environmental 
conditions (temperature, humidity, pressure); component 
common status conditions and operating characteristics as 
normally closed/open, running, stand-by; testing and 
maintenance procedures and characteristics - test interval, 
test configuration, planned versus corrective maintenance 
strategy, maintenance configuration. 
 
Two main topics were discussed: 
- the strength of relation between the individual CCF 
coupling factors (contributing to total CCF potential) and 
ageing phenomena 
- CCF prevention measures effect on the coupling factors 
versus ageing relation (estimated for those CCF coupling 
factors which were evaluated as coincident with ageing 
phenomena, with at least medium level of coincidence). 
 
 
Results 
The following organizations have participated to the 
investigation: 
• Institute for Nuclear Research Pitesti (INR), Romania 
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• Nuclear Research Institute Rez (NRI), Czech Republic 
• Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant (CNPP), Romania 
• National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and the 
Environment (ENEA), Italy 
 
The participants provided answers to all questionnaire 
tables, all the inputs being developed in completely 
independent way. All these inputs were summarized, 
compared and commented.  
 
All the coupling factors were discussed and some specific 
examples, from operating experience were given. Some 
developed remarks [4] and illustrative example for each 
coupling factor are given below. 
 
For hardware based coupling factors: 
▪ same physical appearance 
For the components with significantly different physical 
appearance, connection of this factor with ageing may be 
seen as negligible. However, if there is some level of 
similarity, this may be further increased by ageing effects, 
because the specific features of the individual components 
may gradually disappear in the process of ageing 
(decreased readability of component identifiers, loss of 
identification elements etc.). During discussions, it was 
given as an illustrative example of this coupling factor the 
removal, from operation to maintenance, of other pumps 
than the one needed, due to the component 
misidentification. 
▪ system layout/ configuration 
In PSA model, this case refers to connection of formally 
separated components in higher level of system function 
logic. Any potential increasing of failure rate of this higher 
level component (if it is exposed to some ageing 
mechanisms) due to ageing can be seen as increasing of 
CCF potential. Wrong layout/configuration may results in 
high wear rate of a component category.  Example1: the 
failure of containment spray pumps to meet differential 
pressure requirements, due to air binding at the pump 
suction (resulting from a system piping design error). 
Example2: the failure of bearing of the pumps/motors shift 
– the RMZ (Zero Power Multi-zone Reactor main 
circulating pumps) due to design error - wrong position 
(the situation was identified at preoperational tests and the 
pumps were relocated). 
▪ same component internal parts  
A common construction principle may represent a CCF 
failure potential increasing in time due to effects of ageing. 
The same type of component internal parts does belong to 
CCF factors with significant connection to ageing 
potential, when "same type of component internal parts" 
factor is accompanied by "same manufacturer" attribute. 
Any part of I&C component, having impact on availability 
of same type components in several redundant trains of the 
system, can be seen as very good generic example.  
▪ same maintenance/ test/ calibration characteristics 
One of the main maintenance goals is prevention of effects 
of known and expected-to-occur ageing mechanisms. 
Since the maintenance strategy principles are usually built 
in such a way that there are dependences and correlations 
in planning, organization and way of carrying out the 
individual maintenance activities for various types of 
components, there is some possibility that ageing 
mechanisms may not be addressed adequately not only for 
one, but for all components forming some CCF group in 
PSA model. Example: the failure to load of two diesel 
generators due to shutdown sequencer problems. During 
one diesel generator failure, the diesel could not be loaded 
manually or automatically due to dirty contacts on the 
sequencer. In the second diesel failure, the sequencer 
clutch stuck due to being dirty and needing lubrication. 
The cause was determined to be the lack of quality of 
preventive maintenance.  
▪ manufacturing attributes  
The "same manufacturer" factor overlaps, to some extent, 
with the "same internal parts" factor. The production 
quality is strongly determined by quality assurance 
principles taken into consideration during production, and 
ageing phenomena treatment may be seen as one of them. 
In case when these quality principles are deficient from 
ageing treatment point of view, component performance 
degradations may occur with high probability and the 
phenomena is likely to impact all group components. 
▪ construction/ installation attributes  
Some potential exists for latent effect of hidden impact of 
wrong equipment installation for a long time period and 
strengthening of it in interaction with ageing mechanisms, 
but such potential was considered as relatively weak. 
 
For operation based coupling factors: 
▪ same operating team 
The actions of the same team could be a strong cause for 
occurrence of CCF failures. In time, the component 
potential to survive to the consequences of wrong activity 
of the same operational team, assuming the interference 
with ageing mechanisms is very small. Still, there are two 
side of the coin, since the typical ageing effects are 
developing during a relatively long time period, the 
operational team may be subjects to changes within, or 
they may gain experience and skills. Example: All 
emergency service water pumps were found in tripped 
status, as the result of an emergency engine shutdown 
device being tripped. The operational personnel did not 
recognize that the trip devices has to be reset following 
testing. 
▪ same operating procedure  
The influence of the same operational procedures was 
considered higher than the influence of the same team, 
because the changes in the content of procedures are 
usually smaller and less frequent than the changes in the 
operational team. As a consequence, accumulation of 
procedure negative effects may impact more strongly the 
components in a long period of time. Example: Two 
auxiliary feed water pumps failed to develop the proper 
flow output. It was determined that the manual governor 
speed control knobs had been placed in the wrong position 
due to an error in the procedure. 
▪ same maintenance/ test/ calibration team  
The influence of this factor is variable, tightly connected 
with the frequency of changes in the maintenance/ test/ 
calibration staff (which is given by plant human resources 
politics, including level of outsourcing and safety culture 
of external contractors, and can be different among the 
plants). In the operation of plants with relatively low staff 
fluctuation, the factor may be quite important, because the 
maintenance/test/calibration style may become loaded 
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with all kind of negative stereotypes, or the team may 
accumulate experience and become more skilled in 
performing their activities. Example: A number of 
breakers in electric power supply system failed to close 
due to dirt and foreign material accumulation in breaker 
relays. Existing maintenance activities allowed the relays 
to be inoperable and not detected as inoperable until the 
time that the breakers were called-on to operate.   
▪ same maintenance/ test/ calibration procedures 
For a number of important safety components, latent 
effects of a defective maintenance, cumulated and 
interfering with real ageing impacts may be stronger than 
the impact of operational problems, leading to initiation or 
strengthening of ageing mechanism impact. If 
maintenance strategy is deficient in some way, there is a 
quite real chance that undesirable effects will repeatedly 
take place during periodically performed maintenance 
activities, potentially contributing to ageing. Example: 
activation of the high bearing temperature alarm of 
component cooling water pump. Investigation revealed 
that the pump bearing had rotated, blocking oil flow to the 
bearing; apparent cause was pump/ motor misalignment; 
11 days later, the same symptoms appeared in operation of 
the other component cooling water pump. 
 
For environmental based coupling factors:  
▪ same plant location 
It implies similar impact of external environmental 
characteristics which define, to some extent, ageing 
potential. The impact of many environmental stresses (fire, 
flood) is normally modelled explicitly (by analysing the 
phenomena involved and incorporating their impact into 
the plant/ system models) in current PSA studies. Other 
environmental factors, such as high humidity and 
temperature fluctuations are typically considered in CCF 
analysis and treated parametrically. The factor may be 
seen as relatively important for most of the components. 
Example: the common trip of components due to weather 
effects - freezing up in winter or overheating in summer. 
▪ same component location 
A stressful location implies a number of negative 
influences challenging component status during the whole 
component life period. If these influences generate 
common cause failure potential, CCF vulnerability will 
gradually increase as a consequence of negative impacts 
accumulation.  Example: Both auxiliary feed water pumps 
were sprayed by stream of water from broken piping of 
service water system. As result, auxiliary feed water 
system was lost completely. 
▪ internal environment/ working medium  
There is an intensive contact between internal environment 
and the component under concern, and the negative 
consequences may occur rapidly in a case of harsh internal 
environment. Example: the failure of four of six service 
water pumps due to wear caused by high pump vibration. 
The pumps have suction on ocean, and the failures were 
caused by excessive quantities of abrasive particles in the 
ocean water. 
 
The estimations were made using a five-degree colour 
scheme, assigned to correspond to one of the following 
defined categories: week, medium-week, medium, 
medium-strong, strong. The scales was used to rank each 
coupling mechanisms and the strength of connection with 
ageing, and the influence of CCF prevention means on the 
links between CCF potential and ageing. 
 
Most of the project participants provided samples of data 
describing CCF events from their own operational history, 
and illustrated the link between occurred CCF events and 
ageing phenomena, as the risk associated with selected 
events. Some examples are given in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 - Sample of CCF events from point of view of relation to ageing phenomena (operational experience) 
 
Event description  Risk related impact  Relation to ageing 
Cernavoda NPP - The valves 
controlling the level in Steam 
Generators in emergency situation was 
found to have the seat for impulse air of 
pneumatic relay excessively worn. 
Degraded function of boiler level 
control in emergency situation. 
 
Probable link to ageing, event 
possible to be time dependent. 
Cernavoda NPP - The valves 
controlling the level in Steam 
Generators in emergency situation was 
found to have failed PRV diaphragm. 
Degraded function of boiler level 
control in emergency situation.  
Proven link to ageing. 
Cernavoda NPP - Ageing of wall pass-
through insulation for both 110kV 
buses of Station A. 
Degraded function of 110kV station to 
feed the plant internal services. 
Proven link to ageing. 
TRIGA secondary circuit – the valves 
bodies are corroded, do not seal 
anymore and cannot be operated 
Improper operation of valves results in 
a reduced flow through the system 
which was detected by the increasing 
temperature in primary circuit. 
Wear and erosion processes have as 
effects the walls thinning until 
leakage occurs. Corrosion phenomena 
can make the valve to operate with 
difficulty. The event was caused by 
ageing/inadequate maintenance. 
TRIGA secondary circuit - pipes 
rupture - the underground and external 
pipes very corroded 
Large breaks lead to harsh environment 
and flood with consequential failures of 
multiple equipment. Wall thinning and 
cracking are incipient failures, in time 
they could lead to external leaks. 
Corrosion-erosion may result in pipe 
wall thinning which compromise the 
integrity of the piping and could result 
in external leakages. Event is caused 
by ageing. 
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The strength of connection of CCF coupling factors with 
ageing phenomena was estimated according to what has 
been found both in operational experience and theoretical 
studies, [4]. To better illustrate the estimations for 
connection strength between coupling factors and ageing 
phenomena, Figs 1 and 2 were developed. Estimations 
went from weak to strong impact, using a 5-degrees scale. 
Each group opinions were represented by a different 
colour.  
Mean level of coupling factor coincidence with ageing was 
defined as "Impact", postulated on the base of estimators 
given by the participants groups. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Estimations for connection strength between hardware based coupling factors and ageing phenomena 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Estimations for connection strength between operational/ environmental based coupling factors and ageing 
 
The discussions revealed the following issues: 
▪ All environmental based coupling factors were evaluated 
as relatively strong in connection to ageing; in case of 
same component location factor the estimations were 
made with very small variability of the individual 
estimates 
▪ Same physical appearance and same operating staff were 
evaluated as having weak connection to ageing 
phenomena (with small variability of estimates).  
 
The influence of CCF prevention measures on the strength 
of connection of CCF coupling mechanisms with ageing 
phenomena was estimated also according to operational 
experience and expert judgments.[4].  
 
A summary of these estimations is given in Fig. 3. Mean 
level of influence of ageing on CCF prevention measures 
was defined as "Influence", postulated on the base of 
estimators given by the participants groups. 
 
The discussions revealed the following: 
▪ The CCF prevention strategies based on application of 
diversity principles were found as significantly breaking 
the link between CCF potential and ageing, much more 
than the remaining classes of prevention strategies 
▪ Most of evaluated combinations of prevention strategy 
and CCF coupling factors-ageing links were evaluated as 
having medium influence 
▪ Very good agreement in estimation of impact of 
prevention strategies based on diversity, they were 
evaluated as being really important by all participants. 
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Fig. 3 Influence of CCF prevention means on the links between CCF potential and ageing 
 
Conclusions 
Detailed analysis of operational experience and 
comparison of the questionnaire answers provides 
evidence regarding non-negligible correlation between 
ageing phenomena and other factors that influence the 
potential for common cause failure occurrence.  
 
Some component failure modes, which are sensitive to 
CCF potential, were revealed as a-priori candidates for 
ageing related analysis, as the following: plugging of 
(narrow) pipes, loss of piping system integrity, failure of 
cables insulation, failure to operate for switches. Corrosion 
factor can be seen implicitly as very important from point 
of view of CCF-ageing connection.  
 
The following conclusions can be made based on the 
answers received to questionnaire and on the estimations: 
▪ The relation between common cause failure potential 
represented by individual CCF coupling factors and ageing 
phenomena was estimated as fairly strong, both for total, 
summarized CCF potential, and for individual coupling 
factors. It should be mentioned that, in integrated opinions, 
the connection was never considered as irrelevant.  
As a direct consequence, CCF should constitute a specific 
item of the methodologies developed to treat the ageing 
phenomena effect in the PSA studies.  
 
▪ The agreement among groups fulfilling the questionnaire 
might be considered as pretty good. The participants 
estimations were balanced regarding conservativeness 
level (no evaluator with too distant evaluations 
systematically made – over-optimistic or too pessimistic). 
▪ Each of the four groups of CCF coupling factors was 
found as having at least medium importance regarding 
connection with ageing. The dominating group with 
respect to ageing is the one of environmental based 
factors, the coupling factors from this group could be 
prioritized for more detailed analysis. 
 
▪ The level of subjectivity and corresponding level of 
variability of estimations was generally higher in case of 
combinations of prevention strategy and CCF coupling 
factors-ageing links than in the case of estimated CCF 
coupling factors versus ageing coincidence 
 
▪ The factors that are increasing the CCF potential are 
relatively significantly tied with the factors that are 
increasing the components ageing potential. In some cases, 
the link between CCF and ageing can be identified easily 
(case of same component location), whereas deeper 
understanding of physical, technological, organizational 
processes during operation may be necessary in other 
cases (case of same maintenance staff). 
 
In the future, it is intended to analyse much broader 
samples of operational experience and to perform more 
detailed analysis of available information about CCF 
events and their relation with ageing phenomena. 
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